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CONTRACTS-New Mexico Adopts the Modern
Approach to Interpreting Ambiguities:
C.R. Anthony Company v. Loretto Mall Partners
I. INTRODUCTION
In C.R. Anthony Co. v. Loretto Mall Partners,' the New Mexico
Supreme Court adopted the modern approach to interpreting an ambiguity
in a contract, rejecting New Mexico cases adhering to the traditional,
"plain meaning" rule. This Note sets out the facts and holding of Anthony
and then discusses the origins and views of both the traditional, "plain
meaning" approach and the modern approach to determining whether
an ambiguity exists in a contract and to resolving an ambiguity. The
Note also examines the supreme court's reasoning in adopting the new
rule and the court's analysis of how the rule will operate in New Mexico.
Finally, this Note offers a critique of the Anthony decision.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
C.R. Anthony Company ("Anthony") leased retail space in a shopping
mall from Dartford Company ("Dartford"). Anthony entered into an
amended lease for additional retail space in January of 1982. Loretto
Mall Partners ("Loretto") became Anthony's landlord in 1984 when
Loretto purchased the shopping mall from Dartford.2
Under the original lease, Anthony was to pay a minimum annual rent
of $9350. Additionally, Anthony was to pay an annual percentage rent
equal to 2.5% of Anthony's annual sales, less the amount of the minimum
annual rent. Accordingly, Anthony's obligation to pay the additional
percentage rent began at the point at which its annual sales reached
$374,000, the natural breakpoint, or the point at which $9350 equals
2.5% of $374,000.1
Under the amended lease, Anthony was to pay minimum annual rent
of $55,611. 4 Additionally, Anthony was to pay an annual percentage rent
equal to two-and-one-half percent of Anthony's "Base Net Retail Sales
Figure," which was defined to be $2,224,400.1 Although it was not
designated so, the Base Net Retail Sales Figure equaled the natural
breakpoint, the point at which $55,611 equals 2.5% of $2,224,400. The
amended lease also provided for Anthony's minimum annual rent to be
reduced to $18,370 if the anchor tenant, J.C. Penney Company ("J.C.
1. 112 N.M. 504, 817 P.2d 238 (1991).
2. Id. at 505-06, 817 P.2d at 239-40.
3. Id. at 506, 817 P.2d at 240.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 506-07, 817 P.2d at 240-41.
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Penney"), left the premises and the Mall was unable to replace J.C.
Penney with a new tenant. 6 The amended lease, however, retained the
same percentage rent provision as was in the original lease. The amended
lease did not provide for a recalculation of the percentage rent to be
paid by Anthony if J.C. Penney left the shopping center.
7
J.C. Penney left the shopping center and was not replaced. In 1983,
Anthony began paying the minimum annual rent at the reduced rate.
Additionally, from 1983 to 1988, Anthony paid a percentage rent of
2.5076 of $734,800, the new natural breakpoint computed upon the reduced
amount of minimum annual rent.'
During an internal audit in 1988, Anthony discovered an alternative
construction of the amended lease: even if J.C. Penney left the shopping
center, the breakpoint at which the percentage rent became due was
$2,224,400.00, rather than $734,800.00. Thereafter, Anthony sued to
recover the excess rent paid.9
Finding that the amended lease was unambiguous, the trial court
awarded summary judgment to Anthony for the excess rent paid by
Anthony.' 0 On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that there
was substantial evidence to sustain the trial court's finding that the
amended lease was unambiguous." Justice Ransom, writing for an unan-
imous court, held that "in determining whether a term or expression to
which the parties have agreed is unclear, a court may hear evidence of
the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract and of any
relevant usage of trade, course of dealing, and course of performance.'
12
The court also explained that determining whether an ambiguity exists
is a question of fact. 3
In Anthony, the supreme court found that the evidence explained the
nature of commercial retail leasing in general and the circumstances leading
up to Anthony's lease. The evidence, however, did not demonstrate
ambiguity in the terms of the lease by showing that the terms were
"vague, uncertain, or reasonably susceptible to more than one interpre-
tation," or by clarifying or explaining the terms. Rather, the evidence
suggested that the parties would have added a new provision to the
contract which would have contradicted existing contract provisions.
4
Having found that the contract was unambiguous, the court determined
that the evidence raised an issue of fact as to whether the parties made
a mutual mistake by omitting a provision to reduce the percentage rent
if the minimum rent was reduced because a new anchor tenant was not
6. Id. at 507, 817 P.2d at 241.
7. Id. at 511, 817 P.2d at 245.
8. Id. at 507, 817 P.2d at 241.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 506, 817 P.2d at 240.
11. Id. In New Mexico, an appeal in contract is taken directly to the New Mexico Supreme
Court. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
12. Anthony, 112 N.M. at 508-09, 817 P.2d at 242-43.
13. Id. at 509, 817 P.2d at 243.
14. Id. at 511, 817 P.2d at 245.
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found. 5 Accordingly, the supreme court reversed Anthony's summary
judgment and remanded the matter to the trial court for further evidentiary
hearing on the question of mutual mistake.'
6
III. BACKGROUND OF THE LAW OF RESOLVING
AMBIGUITIES IN A CONTRACT
Parties to a contract reduce their agreement to writing "to provide
trustworthy evidence of the fact and terms of their agreement and to
avoid reliance on uncertain memory.' ' 7 In the process of interpreting a
written contract a "court ascertains the meaning that it will give to the
language used by the parties in determining the legal effect of the
contract.' ' 8 When a court determines the legal effect of a contract, it
necessarily determines the meaning of the language used by the parties,' 9
including the resolution of any ambiguities.
Courts have utilized two methods for determining whether a contract
is ambiguous. Generally, the underlying goal of each approach is to
determine the meaning or intent of the contracting parties;20 however,
the two approaches use different mechanisms.
A. Traditional Approach
The search for the existence of an ambiguity in a contract under the
traditional approach is "conducted within the 'four corners' of the writing,
unaided by any reference to external circumstances." ' 21 This "plain mean-
ing" rule originated from the primitive view that a word was a fixed
symbol with an inherent, objective meaning. Although centuries of in-
tellectual development permitted the rigid view to change, by the end of
the eighteenth century, the view was entrenched in the law of the United
States, resulting in the rule that the "words of a legal document inherently
possess a fixed and unalterable meaning. "22 Even though the rule gradually
became less rigid, by the nineteenth century the law still insisted that
"when the meaning is 'plain'-that is plain by the standard of the
community and of the ordinary reader-no deviation can be permitted. ' 23
The traditional rule survives in many courts today.2
15. Id. at 511-12, 817 P.2d at 245-46.
16. Id. at 506, 817 P.2d at 240. In addition to the matters raised in the claim by Anthony
against the mall, Loretto filed a cross-claim against Dartford for breach of its warranty that
Anthony's obligations under the amended lease conformed with Anthony's past payments. The trial
court granted summary judgment to Loretto against Dartford. The supreme court affirmed Loretto's
summary judgment, reaffirming its prior holding that reliance is not an element for a claim for
breach of an express warranty. Id. at 512, 817 P.2d at 246.
17. 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.2, at 191 (1990).
18. Id. § 7.7, at 236-37.
19. See id.
20. See 4 WALTER H. E. JAEGER, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 600 (3d ed. 1961); 3 ARTHUR L.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 542 (1960).
21. Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, The Parole Evidence Rule and Admissibility of Extrinsic
Evidence to Establish and Clarify Ambiguity in Written Contract, 40 A.L.R.3d 1384, 1389 (1971).
22. 9 JOHN H. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 2461, at 195 (Chadbourn rev. 1981).
23. Id. at 196.
24. See Tinio, supra note 21, at 112 (Supp. 1992) (citing Student Loan Guarantee Found. v.
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Thus, the traditional approach is based on the premise that the written
words of a contract represent the definite expression of the agreement
between the contracting parties and that the contract's terms are, therefore,
conclusive. 25 If the words of the document are "plain and clear," evidence
extrinsic to the writing is not admissible to give meaning to the contract. 26
If the court determines that a document is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence
is allowed to clarify the ambiguity; the extrinsic evidence may not vary
or contradict the agreement. 27
Procedurally, the "plain meaning" approach requires a two-step proc-
ess. First, as a matter of law, the court determines whether an ambiguity
exists. 28 If an ambiguity is found, it is resolved by the jury as a question
of fact. As Professor Williston explains, this division of functions ap-
parently arose out of a "distrust of the jury's ability to answer questions
of fact that call for nice discrimination and an educated mind." 29
The traditional approach has two primary weaknesses. First, words do
not have "one correct" meaning 0 and always need interpretation.' A
word that suddenly appears in empty space, with no history, expresses
nothing at all. To have meaning, a word must have a context and a
history.32 Even words that seem "plain and clear" on the face of a
contract may have another "plain and clear" meaning when considered
in their surrounding circumstances.3 3 The meaning of any word can change,
depending on factors such as the geographical location in which the word
is used; the social, economic, religious, and ethnic group to which the
user belongs; and, the change of times. 4
A word's meaning ultimately depends on the idea it induces in the
mind of the one who uses, hears, or reads it." As Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes said:
A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin
of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according
to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.36
Professor Corbin also concluded that language is always a defective
and uncertain instrument in the law of contracts. 7 Uncertainties in mean-
Barnes, Quinn, Flake & Anderson, Inc., 806 S.W.2d 628 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991); District-Realty Title
Ins. Corp. v. Ensmann, 767 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Hanam, B.V. v. Kittay, 589 F. Supp.
1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)); see also WIGMoRE, supra note 22, § 2461, at 197. Professor Corbin asserts
that the "plain meaning" rule is one of those rules which is "assumed" by courts to exist, but
which has a "beginning no man knows when, coming from no man knows where, seemingly universal
and unchangeable." CoRBN, supra note 20, § 536, at 25-26.
25. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRAuCTS § 230 cmt. b (1932).
26. Tinio, supra note 21, at 1389.
27. Id.
28. See JAEGER, supra note 20, § 616, at 649.
29. Id.
30. CoRIN, supra note 20, § 535, at 16.
31. WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 2470, at 236.
32. CORBIN, supra note 20, § 540, at 90.
33. Id. § 542, at 101-03.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 cmt. a (1979).
35. CORBIN, supra note 20, § 536, at 27-28.
36. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
37. CORBIN, supra note 20, § 536, at 27.
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ing may be greatly reduced when the context of the word's use is
considered.3"
The second weakness of the "plain meaning" approach is that it allows
the court to substitute its own "linguistic education and experience for
that of the contracting parties." 3 9 When a court refuses to consider the
surrounding circumstances of a contract when determining whether an
ambiguity exists, it will not necessarily be the contracting parties' meaning
the court gives to the contract. 40 The "plain meaning," then, is the
meaning given to the contract by the judge who did not write the
contract.4' The court may enforce a different contract than the one the
parties intended to make.42 As described by one court:
[T]he courts [run] the words of the parties through a judicial sieve
whose meshes were incapable of retaining anything but the common
meaning of the words, and which permitted the meaning which the
parties had placed upon them to run away as waste material. 43
Professor Corbin similarly criticized the "plain meaning" view and its
potential for judge-made contracts:
[A]s all great lawyers have believed since the time of Lord Justice
Coke nearly 400 years ago . . . the proper purpose of the law is to
carry out the legitimate intent, the underlying purpose, the "spirit"
if you will, of the contract .... To say that language is to be treated
as if it has no purpose is to reduce law to a dice game, whose only
purpose is the amusement of its participants. But the law does not
exist for the amusement of judges; it assumes that some decisions
are right and some are wrong, and that it is possible to tell the
difference. And the difference is that right decisions help make it
possible for honest people to achieve what they legitimately and fairly
intended, and wrong decisions do not .... To ignore the "spirit"
of the contract is to exalt form over substance."
Nevertheless, the traditional view does have its advantages. It simplifies
the interpretation process by limiting the amount of evidence that can
38. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 cmt. b.
39. Co RiN, supra note 20, § 542, at Ill. When a court finds that a contract is "clear and
unambiguous" under the "plain meaning" rule, the court may not actually mean that the words
had only one meaning and were "clear and unambiguous." The court may have considered the
surrounding circumstances and decided not to give the words a meaning urged by the losing party.
See id. The court may have decided that even if extrinsic evidence were considered, the contract's
meaning would be the same as the "normal" meaning given by the court. See JAEGER, supra note
20, § 609, at 412.
40. CoaBiN, supra note 20, § 542, at 111-12. This is particularly true because the question of
ambiguity under the "plain meaning" rule is a question of law to be determined by the judge and
not a question of fact to be determined by a jury. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS §
212(1) & § 212 cmt. d (1979) (the interpretation of a written document has historically been treated
as a question of law to be decided by the judge).
41. See WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 2462, at 198.
42. See CoRaniN, supra note 20, § 542, at 111-12.
43. Hurst v. W.J. Lake & Co., 16 P.2d 627, 630 (Or. 1932).
44. CoRBiN, supra note 20, § 535, at 20-21 (Supp. 1960).
CON TRA CTS
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
be offered.4 1 It provides predictability and reliability for the interpretation
of commonly used wordsA6 Finally, the traditional approach avoids the
great risk of permitting a party to make a convenient argument that it
meant something other than what is written. 47
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals made an impassioned and com-
pelling plea in favor of the "plain meaning" approach when that court
criticized California's adoption of the modern rule:
[The modern approach] casts a long shadow of uncertainty over all
transactions negotiated and executed .... [I]t leads only to frustration
and delay for most litigants and clogs already overburdened courts.
It also chips away at the foundation of our legal system. By giving
credence to the idea that words are inadequate to express concepts,
[it] undermines the basic principle that language provides a meaningful
constraint on public and private conduct. If we are unwilling to say
that parties, dealing face to face, can come up with language that
binds them, how can we send anyone to jail for violating statutes
consisting of mere words lacking 'absolute and constant referents'?
How can courts ever enforce decrees, not written in language un-
derstandable to all, but encoded in a dialect reflecting only the 'lin-
guistic background of the judge'? Can lower courts ever be faulted
for failing to carry out the mandate of higher courts when 'perfect
verbal expression' is impossible? Are all attempts to develop the law
in a reasoned and principled fashion doomed to failure as 'remnant[s]
of a primitive faith in the inherent potency and inherent meaning of
words'? 48
B. Modern Approach
In contrast to the "plain meaning" method of contract interpretation,
the modern approach permits the court to consider evidence extrinsic to
the contract to determine whether an ambiguity exists. 49 To determine
the parties' meaning, the factfinder puts itself in the position of the
parties at the time the parties made the contract,50 and considers the
surrounding circumstances.5 According to Professor Farnsworth, the ev-
idence to be considered includes the "circumstances surrounding the
making of the contract and . . . any relevant usage of trade, course of
dealing, and course of performance. '5 2 The court, however, may not
consider prior negotiations."
45. FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, § 7.12, at 271.
46. See id.; WIOMORE, supra note 22, § 2462(2), at 199-200 (under the modern approach, a
lawyer would not be safe in giving advice about a contract's construction).
47. See WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 2462, at 199.
48. Trident Center v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1988).
49. Tinio, supra note 21, at 1392.
50. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 cmt. b (1979).
51. See ColiwN, supra note 20, § 536, at 29.
52. FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, § 7.12a, at 279-80.
53. Id.
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The circumstances to be considered include the "persons, objects, and
events to which the words are to be applied and which caused the words
to be used" by the contracting parties.54 A contract's words are given
meaning in light of the circumstances."
Unlike the "plain meaning" approach, the modern view does not require
a threshold finding by the court that an ambiguity exists . 6 The question
of the contract's meaning as a whole is a question of fact to be determined
by the jury."
A 1935 case demonstrates how opposite results obtain under the two
approaches. An insured man left a life insurance policy to be paid to
his wife upon his death. After his death, the insurance proceeds were
automatically paid to his wife. As it turned out, the insured had two
wives. The court held that the word "wife" meant the second, invalid
wife. Everyone who knew the insured knew the second wife as the insured's
wife; no one even knew the legal wife existed. All the circumstances
indicated it was the second wife who was to benefit from the insurance
policy. On its face, the insurance policy appeared to require the proceeds
to be distributed to the legal wife; however, after considering the cir-
cumstances surrounding the issuance of the policy, the court determined
that "wife" did not mean the legal wife.58 Had the court only considered
"wife" as it appeared in the policy, it is entirely possible that the legal
wife would have been the beneficiary.
IV. THE NEW MEXICO SUPREME COURT ABANDONS THE
"PLAIN MEANING" APPROACH AND ADOPTS THE MODERN
APPROACH
In Anthony, the New Mexico Supreme Court rejected the "plain mean-
ing" approach, overruling its cases adhering to the traditional rule. The
court then adopted the modern view.59 The court's underlying policy, its
reasoning, and its explanation of how the new rule is to be applied in
New Mexico are examined in the following paragraphs. This section
concludes with a brief critique of the Anthony court's decision.
A. Determination of Ambiguity
Justice Ransom, writing for the New Mexico Supreme Court, empha-
sized that the underlying policy in interpreting contracts is to give a
contract the meaning the parties "attached to ... particular term[s] or
expression[s] at the time the parties agreed to those provisions."' 6 His-
54. CoRarN, supra note 20, § 536, at 28.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(1) (1979).
56. Id. § 202 cmt. a.
57. Id. § 212(2) (Supp. 1986); CoRBN, supra note 20, § 554, at 219. Of course, the question
is one of law if the evidence is so clear that no reasonable person would interpret the contract in
any way but one. Id. § 212(2) cmt. e (1979).
58. In re Soper's Estate, 264 N.W. 427 (Minn. 1935).
59. Anthony, 112 N.M. at 508-09, 817 P.2d at 242-43.
60. Id. at 509, 817 P.2d at 243.
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torically, New Mexico cases have generally followed a "plain meaning"
or "four-corners" standard for determining whether a contract is am-
biguous and have excluded evidence of circumstances surrounding the
transaction to explain the purposes and context of the contract. 6' The
Anthony court, however, decided that its policy is better supported by
the modern approach for interpreting contracts. 62
The supreme court, in Anthony, accepted the reasoning of other states
that have rejected the "plain meaning" approach and adopted the rea-
soning of respected authorities, including Professors Corbin and Farn-
sworth, and the second Restatement, all of which advocate the modern
view .63
B. Question of Law or Fact
Justice Ransom concluded that to treat the issue of ambiguity as a
question of law would "relegate to judicial review divination the deter-
minative issues of many contract disputes." 64 Apparently, Justice Ransom
shared with respected authorities a concern about the potential for judge-
made contracts.
The Anthony court also explained how the newly adopted modern
approach will function in New Mexico. In the past, the determination
of whether an ambiguity exists had been a question of law to be determined
by the court, and resolution of an ambiguity had been a question of
fact to be decided by the fact finder. 65 The discovery and resolution of
ambiguities under the newly adopted modern approach, however, are to
be treated like any other fact question." Interpretation of a word's
meaning in a contract is a question of fact unless the evidence is "so
clear that no reasonable person would determine the issue before the
court in any way but one." 67 If there were but one interpretation of the
issue, the question becomes one of law and it is the court's duty to
decide the issue. Whether the evidence is disputed depends on witness
credibility, or the existence of conflicting inferences; these issues are to
be resolved by the fact finder.6
61. Id. at 508, 817 P.2d at 242 (citing Clark v. Sideris, 99 N.M. 209, 213, 656 P.2d 872, 876
(1982); Acquisto v. Joe R. Hahn Enters., Inc., 95 N.M. 193, 195, 619 P.2d 1237, 1239 (1980)).
62. See Anthony, 112 N.M. at 504, 817 P.2d at 238.
63. See id. at 508-09, 817 P.2d at 242-43; CoaIN, supra note 20, § 542, at 101 (Supp. 1992)
(the court's duty is to give effect to the reasonable expectations of the parties); FARNSWORTH, supra
note 17, § 7.7, at 238 (the court's concern is with the expectations aroused in the parties by the
contract's language); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 202, 201, & 201 cmt. c. (1979) (the
"primary search is for a common meaning of the parties, not a meaning imposed by law").
64. Anthony, 112 N.M. at 510, 817 P.2d at 244.
65. Id. at 509-10, 817 P.2d at 243-44 (citing Young v. Thomas, 93 N.M. 677, 679, 604 P.2d
370, 372 (1979); Paperchase Partnership v. Bruckner, 102 N.M. 221, 223, 693 P.2d 587, 589 (1985)).
66. Id. at 509, 817 P.2d at 243.
67. Id. at 510, 817 P.2d at 244.
68. Id.
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C. Critique
Today, some respected commentators recognize that it is not possible
to determine the parties' intent by merely looking within the four corners
of a document. 69 A word's meaning varies according to the circumstances
in which it is used. 70 Believing that the traditional approach will yield
absolute security in interpretation is a "dream of the impossible." '7'
Although the modern view presents a risk of parties conveniently
inventing an intent to fit their current needs, 72 there are limitations on
the modern process. First, the words themselves limit how far the fact
finder can go in the interpretation process. 73 "[T]here is a critical breaking
point . . . beyond which no language can be forced .... -74 Secondly,
as Justice Ransom specifically cautioned in Anthony, extrinsic evidence
is only admissible for the purpose of interpretation; it is not admissible
to change, contradict, or expand the contract terms. 75 The Anthony court
also noted that procedural limitations are available to protect the "integrity
of the interpretation process," such as conditionally admitting evidence
or making offers of proof.76
In New Mexico, contract interpretation is no longer subject to the
"judicial sieve ' 77 as a matter of law. 7 Rather, contract interpretation is
now a question of fact to be decided in the context of all surrounding
circumstances. 79
V. CONCLUSION
In Anthony, the New Mexico Supreme Court overruled its previous
cases and adopted a modern approach for interpreting contracts. The
modern rule permits the court to consider evidence extrinsic to the contract
to determine whether an ambiguity exists. The new rule furthers the
policy of giving contracts the meaning intended by the contracting parties.?
KARLA K. POE
69. See CORBIN, supra note 20, § 536, at 27-28; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202
cmt. b (1979).
70. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 201 cnt. a, 202.
71. See WiGmORE, supra note 22, § 2462, at 199.
72. Id.
73. FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, § 7.10, at 259.
74. Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co., 239 F. Supp. 976, 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
75. Anthony, 112 N.M. at 509, 817 P.2d at 242; see FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, § 7.12, at
272.
76. Anthony, 112 N.M. at 509 n.4, 817 P.2d at 243 n.4.
77. See Hurst v. W.J. Lake & Co., 16 P.2d 627, 630 (Or. 1932).
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 cmt. d (1979).
79. Id. § 212(2); CORBIN, supra note 20, § 554, at 219.
80. See Anthony, 112 N.M. at 509, 817 P.2d at 243.
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